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Defendant. 
REPORT ANO RECOMMEND~TION1 
status 
This cause is before the Court on the Plaintiff, United 
States' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #66), filed on August 5, 1993, and 
the United States' Motion for court Approval of settlement 
Notwithstanding Objections of Relator (Doc. #87), filed on 
October 5, 1993 (hereinafter collectively Settlement Motions). By 
Order (Doc. #89) entered on October 6, 1993, the District court 
referred the Settlement Motions to the undersigned ••to conduct a 
hearing and to submit to this Court proposed findings of fact and 
recommendations in accordance with 28 u.s.c. §636(b) and Local Rule 
6.0l(a) on the approval of the proposed settlement." Id. at 2. 
Pursuant to the District Court's instructions, a hearing on the 
fairness, adequa~y, and reasonableness of the proposed settlemsnt 
1 Specific, written objectiong may be filed in accordance with Rule 6.02, 
Local Rules, United States District Court, Middle District of Florida, within 
ten (10) days after service of this dccument. ?ailure to timely aerve objections 
shall bar the party from a de novo determination by a district judge and from 
attacking factual findings on appeal. 
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was held on April 20-22, 1994. On May 19, 1994, the parties filed 
proposed findings and conclusions. See Plaintiff's Proposed 
Findings or Fact and Memorandum or Law in support or Motion for 
Approval of Settlement (Doc. #193); Relator's Proposed Findings of 
Fact and Memorandum of Law (Doc. #192) (hereinafter Relator's 
Memorandum) ; Defendant Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida, 
Inc.'s Proposed Conclusions of Law and Recoltllllendation (Doc. #191); 
Defendant Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida, Inc.'s Proposed 
Findings of Fact (Doc. #190); see also Defendant Blue cross and 
Blue Shield of Florida Inc.'s Post-Hearing Memorandum of Law in 
Support of Approval of ths Proposed Settlement (Doc. #189), filed 
on May 19, 1994,. 
lindings ot Faot 
The Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) of the United 
States Department of Heal th and Human Services is the federal 
agency responsible tor administering the Medicare Part B program. 
HCFA itself does not process claims for Medicare Part B benefits, 
but contracts with private insurance companies, known as carriers, 
to perform that function. By law, carriers are compensated for the 
cost of performing under their contract. Thus, carriers neither 
make a profit nor sustain a loss on their contracts with HCFA. 
Since 1966, Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida, Inc. 
(hereinafter BCBSF) has been the carrier for the Medicare Part B 
program in Florida. As the Florida carrier, ECBSF bears 
responsibility for processing all Medicare Part B claims 
originating in the state of Florida, which amounts to approximately 
2 
---- -. - n .t 
-• t t - - 1.:: ·· , .: r :\ ' 1 ;,c1Jf.": I 78 - ~0--; i ~ - :: .LJ:~·\ .: ~~ ·::\~CS~ -
36 million claims annually. BCBSF is said to be the second largest 
Medicare Part B contractor in the nation. 
For a number of years before the events at issue in this 
lawsuit, BCBSF's claims processing operation was computerized. In 
particular, the automated process worked as follows. 2 A claim 
received through the mail room3 was copied onto microfilm, and 
assigned an internal-control number {ICN). The claim would then 
be sorted and sent to an examiner to be entered into the computer 
system. After this was done, the claim itself as well as the 
microfilm copy were put in storage. Once entered into the computer 
system, the claim would do one of three things: (1) it would 
proceed directly to payment; (2) it would be denied by the 
computer; or (3) it would suspend out of the system as a result of 
an audit or edit, which were programs designed to identify claims 
which may be unallowable in whole or in part. If the claim 
suspended out of the system, it would be the responsibility of a 
claims examiner to evaluate the claim and determine if it should 
be paid and the amount that should be paid. If it was determined 
the claim should be paid in whole or in part, the audit or edit was 
overridden by use of a "force code, 11 and the claim was permitted 
to proceed to the next system location. 
2 The explAnation in the text is somewhat oversimplified. For example, 
claims apparently could be suspended by more than ona audit or edit, 
necessitating a review of each of the grounds for which the claim was suspended. 
The description in the text, however, is probably sufficient for purposes of 
evaluating the fairness, adequacy and reasonableness of the settlement. 
3 Claims were also received electronically. However, this process was not 
explained in detail at tha hearing. 
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BCBSF, with HCFA's approval, contracts with another company 
for the actual data processing system and services needed to 
process the volume of Medicare Part B claims it receives. The 
company providing these services is kno~n as the facilities 
management contractor. Since the 1970s the facilities management 
contractor for BCBSF was a company called Electronic Data Systems 
corporation (hereinafter EDS). 
HCFA monitors the performance of all of its carriers, 
including BCBSF, through a process known as the contractor 
performance evaluation program (CPEP). This annual evaluation 
takes into account all aspects of a carrier's performance, and 
ranks each carrier against all the others in the Medicare program. 
There were numerous factors that entered into a carrier's CPEP 
score, but generally speaking, the CPEP program focused on five 
areas: (1) claims processing in terms of both timeliness and 
accuracy; (2) quality of service to the public; (3) adequacy of 
safeguards taken to prevent fraud; (4) how well HCFA's reporting 
requirements were met; and {5) efficiency of the carrier's services 
and whether it stayed within its budget. 
One of the ways HCFA obtains data for evaluating the 
performance of carriers is a procedure by which government auditors 
check a sample of the claims processed by the carrier to determine 
the accuracy or the carrier's claims processing. In particular, 
a program,the specifications of which are set by HCFA, selects a 
statistical sample of the claims processed by BCBSF, and this 
sample is then manually audited by BCBSF end-of-line quality 
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assurance employees. Their findings are transmitted to HCFA, as 
is a sub-sample of the claims previously selected for auditing. 
HCFA auditors then audit the sub-sample, and compare their findings 
with those of the end-of-line quality assurance workers. The 
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CPEP score. According to Deborah Richardson Tucker, the supervisor 
of end-of-line quality assurance during the relevant time period, 
an error is graded more seriously if it is found by HCFA. 
In or about November 1987, BCBSF, at the behest of HCFA, 
initiated a bidding process for the facilities management 
subcontract designed to open the process to competitive bids. 
Under this bidding process, a company who had not yet developed all 
of the features of the system contained in its proposal could 
nevertheless receive the same score as a company, like EDS, whose 
system was already in place. As a result of this process, the 
proposal of GTE Data Services, Inc. (hereinafter GTEDS) was 
accepted. HCFA approved the selection of GTEDS in May 1988. 
The conversion from the EDS data processing system to the 
GTEDS system was scheduled to occur no later than December 2, 1988, 
the day the EDS subcontract was to expire. Within days after GTEDS 
was awarded the facilities management subcontract, however, BCBSF 
formally asked EDS to agree to extend its subcontract to 
February 28, 1989. See Defendant Exhibit 35, filed on April 21, 
1994, EDS declined this request. See Defendant Exhibit 36, filed 
on April 21, 1994. consequently, BCBSF was faced with the prospect 
of having to convert to a new facilities management subcontractor 
5 
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who did not yet have a functioning system in a _period of six 
months. 
Before the new GTEDS system was brought on line, SCBSF created 
an implementation team of employees to assist in the transition. 
In addition, BCBSF hired and trained hundreds of additional 
employees to assist in the conversion. In accordance with the 
established schedule, the GTEDS system was brought on line over 
Thanksgiving weekend, 1988. 
Immediately after it was brought on line, problems developed 
with the new GTEDS system. Features would not function properly 
or could not be used. Claims, once evaluated by a claims examiner 
and approved, would "loop" in the system rather than proceed to the 
next system location. With respect to those claims for which a 
valid prescription was required, the system was "dropping" the 
prescriptions, resulting in these claims being suspended for lack 
of a valid prescription. These problems, by and large, were not 
resolved quickly, and a large backlog of unprocessed Medicare 
Part B claims began to accumulate. BCBSF soon received numerous 
complaints from physicians regarding payment of their claims. 
Eventually, inquiry was made by HCFA and members of the United 
states Congress regarding why claims were not being paid in a 
timely fashion. 
Various measures were taken by BCBSF management and its 
employees to deal with the backlog. Employees worked many hours 
of overtime, and workers were reassigned to assist claims examiners 
in attempting to process the claims to reduce the backlog. Later, 
6 
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claims e~aminers were instructed to force claims through the 
system, using the force codes, without conducting the required 
manual raview of the appropriateness of the claim. Claims that 
could not be forced through the system were sent to a system 
location which effectively meant they were deleted from the system. 
Although these claims were to be re-ICNed and reentered into the 
system, it has been alleged many of these claims were simply 
discarded without being reentered. In some instances, for claims 
requiring a prescription, but for which the system was unable to 
retain a prescription, phony prescription information was added to 
the claim to pennit it to process to payment. 
In addition, system audits and edits were turned off, 
including audits and edits mandated by HCFA. In one or two 
instances, HCFA-mandated audits and/or edits were turned off 
without the knowledge or approval of HCFA. To ensure the end-of-
line auditors were aware of those audits and edits which had been 
turned off, a flip-chart or list of such audits and edits was 
posted in the end-of-line audit area. The end-of-line auditors 
were instructed to audit the claims as if all of the audits and 
edits had been turned off, to ensure they would catch those errors 
which would normally be intercepted by an audit or edit. 
The Relater, Theresa Burr, had been employed by BCBSF for 
about nine years at the time of the transition from the EDS system 
to the GTEDS system. During and after the transition until she 
left BCBSF, Burr was assigned to work in the durable medical 
7 
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equipment (DME) cl~itts processing area. 4 She was selected to be a 
project leader over the DME section during the transition, and, on 
at least one occasion, participated in the decision to turn an 
audit off. She also used force codes to process claims without 
conducting the required review, and instructed others to do the 
same.. Further, she personally deleted claims. She eventually left 
BCBSF in August of 1989. 
About three weeks after she resigned, Burr, with the help of 
an attorney, prepared an affidavit alleging she was instructed to 
"delete a large nu1n:ber of Medicare Part B claims from the GTE 
system" in order to "reduce the Medicare Part B claims backlog and 
demonstrate favorable claims inventory levels." Defendant Exhibit 
12, filed on April 21, 1994. Her affidavit also alleged she was 
instructed to recommend resubmission of any claims that had been 
deleted in the event a supplier or beneficiary inquired about such 
a claim. 
Burr's allegations led to a criminal investigation involving 
the Office of the United states Attorney for the Middle District 
of Florida, and the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) of HHS. 
In February 1991, Burr initiated the instant action, pursuant to 
the qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 
§ 3729 et seq., alleging various violations of the FCA. Her 
Complaint was filed under seal and remained so until April 1992, 
i Durable medical equipment includes such things as wheelchairs, hospital 
beds, walkera, and oxygen concentrators. 
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when the United States elected to intervene and take over 
prosecution of the case. 
The Settlement Agreement at issue, see Plaintiff Exhibit Sa, 
filed on April 20, 1994, is part of a three-way settlement between 
the United States, GTEDS, and BCBS~4 see Plaintiff Exhibits Sb, 
Sc, filed on April 20, 1994. In exchange for a release of certain 
specified civil claims, BCBSF has agreed, as part of the instant 
settlement, to pay the United states the sum of $10 million. In 
addition, in settlement of its $15 million administrative claim 
against HCFA for certain costs, BCBSF has agreed to accept the sum 
of $4 million. Plaintiff Exhibit ab at 3. Finally, in settlement 
of its claim against GTEDS for breach of its facilities management 
subcontract, BCBSF has agreed to accept the sum of $9,520,091.00. 
Plaintiff Exhibit Sc at 4. Each of the latter two settlements is 
made conditional upon the Court's approval of the instant 
Settlement Agreement, which is the agreement to which Relator 
objects. 
conclusions ot Law 
Under the FCA, the United States must obtain Court approval 
before dismissing a civil action brought by a qui tam relater. 
31 u.s.c. § 3730(c) (2) (A). Similarly, 
The Government may settle the action with the defendant 
notwithstanding the objections of the person initiating 
the action if the court determines, after a hearing, that 
the proposed settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable 
under all the circumstances. 
Id. § 3730(c) (2) (B). The test mandated by this section is 
identical to that applied by the courts in reviewing settlements 
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of class action claims. United States ex rel. McCoy v. California 
Medical Review, Inc., 133 F.R.D. 143, 148 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (citing 
132 Cong. Rec. 29,322 (1986)). 
A number of criteria have been identified as pertinent to the 
fairness, adequacy, and reasonableness of a class action 
settlement. For example, a leading treatise suggests the following 
factors be considered: 
1. Likelihood of recovery, or likelihood of success 
2. Amount and nature of discovery or evidence 
3. Settlement terms and conditions 
4. Recommendations and experience of counsel 
5. Future expense and likely duration of litigation 
6. Recommendation of neutral parties, if any 
7. Number of objectors and nature of objections 
a. The presence of good faith and the absence of collusion 
2 H. Newberg & A. Conte, Newberg on Class Actions, S 11.43 (3d ed. 
1992). The Eleventh Circuit has approved a similar set of factors 
for consideration by the trial court when evaluating the fairness, 
adequacy, and reasonableness of a settlement. See Cotton v. 
Hinton, 559 F.2d 1326, 1330-31 (5th Cir. 1977) 5 (finding the 
following factors relevant, among others: (l) "the facts and law 
relevant to the proposed compromise; " ( 2) "the terms of the 
settlement;" ( 3) "the judgment of experienced counsel for the 
5 The Eleventh Circuit has adoptQd aa binding precedent all decisions of 
tha former Fifth Ci:cuit handed down prior to tha close of business on September 
30, 1981. See Bonner v. City of Pri~hara, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th cir. 1981) 
(en bane). 
10 
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parties;u (4) the "overriding public interest in favor of 
settlement;" and (S) the "number of objectors .. and the "objections 
raised."} ; see also Leverso v. Southtrust Bank of Al., Nat, l 
Assoc., 18 F.3d 1527, 1530 n.6 (11th Cir. 1994) (outlining various 
factors); Bennett v. Behring corp., 737 F.2d 982, 986 (11th cir. 
1984) (same). 
In light of the evidence presented at the hearing on the 
settlement, the Court considers the following factors most 
pertinent in this case: (1) the likelihood the United States would 
prevail at trial, and the range of possible recovery if the United 
States did prevail at trial; ( 2) the amount and nature of the 
discovery conducted in the case; ( 3) future expense and likely 
duration of further litigation in this case; (4) the terms of thQ 
settlement Agreement; and (5) whether there is any evidence of 
fraud or collusion in the negotiation of the Settlement Agreement. 
After a general discussion of each of these factors, the Court will 
consider the various objections raised by the Relater. 
A. Burden or proof 
Before proceeding to a consideration of these factors, the 
court must resolve a dispute between the parties as to which party 
bear~ the burden of proof with regard to the fairness, adequacy, 
and reasonableness of the settlement Agreement. The ordinary rule 
in the class action context is the "[p)roponents of class action 
settlements bear the burden of developing a record demonstrating 
that the settlement distribution is fair, reasonable and adequate." 
Holmes v. Continental can Co., 706 F. 2d 1144, 114 7 (11th Cir. 
11 
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1983). The United States maintains, however, the Relater should 
bear the burden of proving her objections should be sustained. It 
contends the Relater can meet this burden only by showing the 
decision to enter into the Settlement Agreement was arbitrary and 
capricious, citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. 
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). 
The United states' position on this issue is not well taken. 
This is not a case where an agency of the government is construing 
a statute it is charged with enforcing. Rather, the United states 
is, in substance, making a business decision. Hence, this is not 
a case of agency action within the meaning of the Volpe decision. 
For this reason, the court does not believe this standard has any 
application in the context of the settlement of a civil lawsuit, 
even one involving the United States. 6 
It would be particularly inappropriate to apply such a 
standard of review in tha context of a qui tam action under the 
FCA. The 1986 amencL~ents to the FCA, among other things, were 
intended "to enhance private citizen assistance in curbing 
government fraud." United states v. Hill, 676 F. Supp. 1158, 1167 
(N.D. Fla. 1987), Toward that end, the FCA, as amended: 
6 Tha United States citea Unitad seaess v. City o~ Miami, 614 F.2d 1322 
(5th Cir. 1980), for the proposition that deference is to be given to aettlements 
entered into by tha united States Department of Justice. While that decision 
contains language supporting that proposition, the caaa did not involve a claim 
unde~ the FCA, and the court's holding appea.r$ to be limited to the unique 
circumstancas prsBented cy that case. Sea id. at 1333. More important, this 
opinion was superseded when the full Fifth Circuit granted a rehearing en bane. 
See United sea~es v. City of Mia.mi, 664 F.2d 435 (5th Cir . 1981) (en bane) (per 
curiam). 
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(1) explicitly allows the relater to remain a party to the action 
even after the United States intervenes; (2) grants the relater the 
opportunity to file objections to a proposed settlement, and to be 
heard on those objections; and (3) makes any settlement of a qui 
tam action opposed by the relater subject to approval by the Court 
after a hearing. See 31 U • S • C • § 3 7 3 O ( c) • Clearly, "it was 
Congress' intent that qui tam plaintiffs play an active role in 
settlement hearings." McCoy, 133 F.R.D. at 148. 
This interpretation is supported by the legislative history 
of the 1986 amendments. According to the Senate Judiciary 
committee report on the amendments: 
Subsection (c) (l) provides qui tam plaintiffs with a more 
direct role not only in keeping abreast of the 
Government's efforts and protecting his financial stake, 
but also in acting as a check that the Government does 
not neglect evidence, cause undu(e] delay, or drop the 
false claims case without legitimate reason •• 
Id. (quoting s. Rep. No. 345, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 
1986 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 5290-91 (emphasis added)). 
Imposing on the Relator the burden of proof--particularly the heavy 
burden advocated by the United States--would clearly frustrate the 
intent of congress that qui tam plaintirfs serve as a check on 
neglect of FCA cases by government officials. Only by requiring 
the United states to come forward with reasons why the settlement 
should be approved may the relater effectively serve the checking 
function envisioned by Congress when it enacted the 1986 amendments 
to the FCA. Therefore, the Court declines to impose the burden of 
proof on the Relater. 
13 
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The Relator, on tha other hand, contends the United_ States 
should have the burden of proving the fairness of the Settlement 
Agreement not simply by a preponderance of the evidence, but by 
clear and convincing evidence, citing In re General Motors corp. 
Engine Interchange Litig., 594 F.2d 1106, 1126 n.JO (7th Cir.) 
(hereinafter In re General Motors), cert. denied sub nom. Oswald 
v. General Motors Corp., 444 u.s. 870 (1979). She relies on the 
fact neither she nor her attorneys were permitted to be present 
during the settlement negotiations as supporting the imposition of 
such a heightened burden. 
The Court is not convinced that In re General Motors is 
applicable to the case at hand. In that case, the Judicial Panel 
on Multidistrict Litigation transferred seven actions pending in 
various federal district courts to the United States District Court 
for the Northern District of Illinois for consolidated pretrial 
proceedings. The district court presiding over these proceedings 
entered an order appointing a committee of six attorneys to 
represent the plaintiffs in all pretrial proceedings. One of these 
attorneys participated in negotiations with the defendant without 
the consent of counsel for all named plaintiffs, in apparent 
violation of tha district court's order. The district court 
declined to require the attorney to disclose the progress of the 
negotiations or any agreements that had bean reached, and once a 
settlement was reached, foreclosed discovery into the settlement 
negotiations. Further, the district court limited the objectors' 
14 
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examination of the attorney responsible at the hearing on the 
fairness of the settlement. 
In this case, by contrast, Relator did not participate 
directly in the negotiations in this case, but was consulted 
frequently by counsel for the United States. Her exclusion was not 
in violation of any court order, and after a tentative settlement 
was reached, she was given six weeks to evaluate the proposed 
settlement and discuss it with various representatives of the 
United states. She was also offered access to computer tapes used 
by the United States in making its damages calculation. Moreover, 
this court did not foreclose Relater from obtaining discovery 
regarding the negotiations, but granted her a significant, although 
limited, opportunity to conduct discovery before the hearing on the 
settlement. Finally, the court in no way limited her examination 
of any witnesses at the hearing with rege1rd to the settlement 
negotiations. Accordingly, the holding of In re General Motors 
does not apply herein. er. Gautreaux v. Pierce, 690 F.2d 616, 630 
{7th Cir. 1982). 
Inasmuch as the standard outlined in§ J730(c) for approval 
of a qui tam lawsuit is the same as that applied by Courts in 
evaluating class action settlements, Congress must have intended 
for the courts to evaluate settlements in a qui tam action in the 
same fashion as the courts historically have evaluated class action 
settlements. That being so, the Court must conclude the 
traditional rule that the proponent of a settlement bears the 
15 
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burden of proving the fairness of that settlement applies in this 
case. 
B. Analysis of the Relevant Factors 
l• The Likelihood of Suoee,s and Potential Recovery at Trial 
A key factor in evaluating the fairness of a proposed 
settlement is a comparison between the settlement fund and the 
likely results of a successful trial. Mashburn v. National 
Healthcare, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 660, 670 (M.D. Ala. 1988). "(TJha 
inquiry should focus upon the terms of the settlement. The 
settlement terms should be compared with the likely rewards the 
(plaintiff] would have received following a successful trial of the 
case." Cotton, 559 F.2d at 1330. In so doing, the Court must take 
into account any factors which tend to suggest the United states 
might not prevail in a trial on the merits. See Bennett, 737 F.2d 
at 987; Mashburn, 684 F. Supp. at 671-72; Gravitt v. General 
Electric:: Co., 680 F. Supp. 1162, 1164 (S.D. Ohio 1988) (holding 
that settlement of qui tam action under the FCA "must be tested 
with a view toward the Government's ability to prove allegations 
by a preponderance of the evidence."). 
Deterndning the likelihood of success involves weighing the 
strengths of the Plaintiff's case and the potential recovery at 
trial against the amount and form of relie! offered in the 
settlement. Mashburn, 684 F. Supp. at 670. Mathematical 
computations of these factors with precision are not required, and 
the court should not attempt to decide the merits of the 
Plaintiff's case; rather, the court's sole function is to "make a 
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rational appraisal of the merits of the action in light of the 
uncertainties of fact and law, [and] to determine whether the 
benefits sought are fair, reasonable, and adequate." Newberg, 
supra, § 11.44, at 11-100 (footnote omitted). 
The principal allegation of the Amended complaint (Doc. #lo), 
filed on July 10, 1992 (hereinafter Amended Complaint or A/C), 
supporting the claim the Defendant is liable under the FCA is: 
Beginning in 1988, defendant Florida Blue Cross, its 
agents and employees, knowingly engaged in a scheme to 
impair, impede, obstruct and defeat the lawful 
governmental runctions ot the Medicare program, and to 
deprive the United States and HHS of the right to have 
the Medicare Part B program administered in the State of 
Florida honestly, fairly and free from deceit, 
corruption, and false and fraudulent statements and 
claims. 
Id., 1 20. It is alleged that, as part of this scheme, BCBSF 
0 knowingly.. engaged in a variety of conduct. Each allegation 
presents its own challenges, however. The following examples are 
given to illustrate the difficulties the United states would face 
in proving its case at trial. 
Example 1: BCBSF "instructed GTE, as well as 
its own employees, to bypass or override 
certain Medicare audits and edits that should 
have been included in the processing of 
Medicare Part B claims." A/C, ! 23. 
It is undisputed audits and edits, including some mandated by 
HCFA, were turned off at the direction of Charles Scott, the Vice 
President of Medicare Part B for BCBSF. Further, Mr. Scott 
testified he did not get approval from HCFA to do so. Carol Walton, 
the Director of the Bureau of Programs Operations of HCFA, 
testified that, while BCBSF should not have turned off audits and 
17 
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edits mandated by HCFA, she was sure it had been done by other 
carriers, and the fact it happened would not affect her decision 
to approve the Settlement Agreement. Further, Tucker, the end-
of-line quality assurance supervisor, testified an error had a 
greater impact if it was discovered by HCFA. Thus, a reasonable 
fact-finder might determine BCBSF itself gained nothing by turning 
off audits and edits since this might adversely affect its quality 
scores on CPEP, and might be persuaded it did so only in response 
to the pressure it received to get claims paid. As carol Walton 
herself testified, BCBSF "had some incredibly difficult decisions'' 
to make. Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing (Doc. #184) 
(hereinafter Hearing (4/20/94)), filed on May 9, 1994, at 228. 
This suggests the United States may have difficulty proving BCBSF 
knowingly acted to defraud the United States in turning off the 
audits and edits. 
Example 2: BCBSF "knowingly created false and 
fictitious prescriptions for certain DME 
claims." A/C, 1 24. 
It is undisputed prescriptions were added to DME claims due 
to the problems the system had with retaining prescriptions. In 
particular, the system was "dropping" prescriptions, thereby 
preventing valid claims from processing to payment. At least two 
witnesses testified prescriptions were added only where the system 
indicated a claim for the sama equipment had been paid for the 
month before or after the month in question. 
18 
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Ms. Walton opined adding prescriptions t-0 claims "sounds :more 
onerous than perhaps it was . " 
testified: 
Hearing (4/20/94) at 228. 
If what you have is a computer prescription file that is 
not working right, if you have evidence that that claim 
had been previously paid, which would indicate at one 
time there had been a prescription, to recreate it is 
actually something that contractors are doing today in 
a CME transition. It's not onerous. It's trying to make 
data files in one place match what apparently must have 
existed at another tim~. 
She 
Id. at 228-29. In light of Ms. Walton's testimony, it appears the 
United States might have difficulty proving BCBSF knowingly acted ~ 
to defraud the united states when its employees added prescriptions ~ 
to claims. 
Example 3: BCBSF "made widespread use of what 
are known as 'force codes' in the 'header' of 
claim processing f orrns to bypass audits and 
edits intended to prevent the payment of 
ineligible, unallowable, or duplicate claims, 
resulting in Medicare payment of claims 
regardless or whether such claims, as 
submitted, satisfied Medicare coverage, 
payment, utilization or eligibility 
guidelines." A/C, ,r 26. 
Ms. Burr does not deny there are legitimate uses for force 
codes. The testimony at the hearing suggested force codes are 
appropriately used to override a particular audit or edit once a 
claims examiner has reviewed the claim and determined the claim 
should be paid. The allegation appears to be BCESF examiners used 
force codes to override audits or edits without conducting the 
necessary review to determine whether the claim was proper. In 
that · regard, BCBSF does not deny force codes were used in this ~ 
fashion as a means to reduce the inventory of unprocessed claims. 
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Using force codes to force claims through without review is 
the functional equivalent of disabling an audit since the net 
effect, at least with respect to the claim forced through, is the 
same. Thus, the use of force codes also raises the question ot 
whether BCBSF acted knowingly to defraud the United states 
government. Again, as with the disabling of HCFA-mandated audits, / 
a reasonable fact-finder might conclude BCBSF did not act with the 
requisite knowledge or intent, but acted simply in response to the 
pressure to get claims paid. . .. 
Example 4: BCBSF "denied or deleted certain 
claims regardless of whether such claims, as 
submitted, satisfied Medicare coverage rules, 
regulations, or guidelines because the GTE 
data-processing system could not timely, 
efficiently or accurately process such 
claims." A/C, 1 30. 
Obviously, denying or deleting a claim does not result in an 
overpayment. The alleged harm to the United States here is that, 
aa a result of denying or deleting claims, such would be re-
submitted, thereby inflating BCBSF's administrative costs. 
There was testimony a.t the hearing that claims--or, more 
precisely, the data in the computer system regarding certain 
claims--were deleted. Although Ms. Burr testified claims were also 
arbitrarily denied, this testimony was largely uncorroborated. 
Ms. Cathy Asher Harrison acknowledged claims information was 
deleted with the intention the microfilm of the claim would be 
pulled, and the claim re-entered into the system. Even though Ms. 
Burr and Ms. Harrison related instances where lists of deleted 
claims were simply discarded into the trash, this arguably could 
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have been acts of one rogue employee who did so without approval 
from her superiors. Even if it were done with approval from upper 
management, Mr. Michael Cascone testified inflation of BCBSF's 
claims count would not necessarily result in a higher cost 
reimbursement by HCFA. 7 
In addition to the problems with the United States' case noted 
above, BCBSF raises the argument the activity alleged in the 
Amended Complaint does not constitute the presentment of a claim 
for payment within the meaning of the FCA. See :n u. s. c. 
§ J729(a). While no authority is cited for this proposition, it 
has some persuasive force. BCBSF does not itself present the 
claims it allegedly wrongfully paid, but maraly processes claims 
submitted by third parties. Thus, an argument could be made that 
even willful payment of these claims without regard to Medicare 
guidelines v1ould not state a claim under the FCA. See United 
Scates ex rel. Simmons v. smith, 629 F. Supp. 124, 126 (s.o. Ala. 
1985) (finding the complaint failed to state a claim under the FCA 
because it did not allege, among other things, "a claim by the 
dezendants against the united states" (emphasis added)) , 8 
7 The court does not undertake tc analyze each and every allegation of the 
Amandar:l complaint. The a.hove examplea ara illustrative, however, of the 
dif fi.culties the United states could fa.ee in prosecuting this case to a 
successful conclusion. 
a Of course, even if the wrongful payments themselves would not support 
liability under the FCA, it could be argued 3CBSF's claims for reimbursement of 
its costs would give rise to such liability to the extent it made any fraudulent 
representations in connection ~ith obtaining such reimbursement. However, it 
was unclear, based on the evidence presented at tha hearing, whether BCBSF did 
make false statements tc HCFA regar~ing its claims processing. 
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Thus, it can be fairly argued the range of recovery should 
start at zero, The Rel a tor has given the Court no estimate 
regarding the top end cf the range of recovery, either at the tM 
hearing or in her post-hearing submission. Her representation she t 
did not have access to sufficient evidence to provide such an f 
estimate, see Relator's Memorandum at 20, is not persuasive. In ~ 
a letter to Assistant Attorney General Frank w. Hunger, Esq., dated 
August 2, 1993, her then-attorney wrote: 
(WJe have undertaken our own estimates of the possible 
magnitude of the processing errors based on summary data 
we obtained from HCFA documents. These data show that 
the extent of the potential loss is enormous 
approximately $900 million assuming comparable national 
trends. 
Defendant Exhibit 9, filed on April 21, 1994, subpart 4-15, at 7. 
If Relator was in a position to estimate the potential loss tdn 
months ago, before the lilllited discovery permitted by the Court was 
conducted, she can hardly expect the Court to credit her 
representation she is unable to do so now. 
In any event, accepting, for the sake of discussion, the 
exceptionally optimistic figure of $900 million as the top of the 
range of recovery, the $10 million provided for in the Settlement 
Agreement is still an adequate amount in light of all of the 
circumstances. Not only could the United States' case be somewhat 
difficult to prove, it likely would be very expensive to marshal 
the evidence to do so . As outlined below, the United states 
already has spent $700,000 investigating this case, which 
presumably does not include the costs associated with obtaining 
court approval of the settlement. 
22 
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investigation really is as deficient as the Relater alleges, it 
would require an even greater investment of resources to prepare 
the case for trial. Given these costs and the risk of no recovery, 
it is entirely understandable the United states chose to accept a 
sure $10 million rather than gamble on a more favorable outcome at 
l 
~!:_rial. ... 
Of coursa, $10 million dollars is only slightly o\rer one 
percent of $900 million. However, this does not take into account 
the $11 million BCBSF has agreed to forego on its administrative 
claim for costs, nor does it. include overpayments recouped by 
BCBSF. As outlined below, the Settlement Agreement in no way 
relieves BCBSF of its obligation to continue to recoup overpayments 
of benefits. 
In addition, "there is no reason, at least in theory, why a 
satisfactory settlement could not amount to a hundredth or even a 
thousandth part of a single percent of the potential recovery." 
City or Detroit v. Grinnell corp., 495 F.2d 448, 455 n.2 (2d Cir. 
1974); see also Bennett, 737 F.2d at 987 n.9 (noting with approval 
the district court's finding that a recovery consisting of only 
5.6% of the potential recovery was fair and adequate). Thus, the 
fact the settlement amount is only a small percentage of the most 
optimistic estimate of the potential recovery does not, ipso facto, 
mandate the rejection of the Settlement Agreement. Finally, it 
must be remembered 0 compromise is the essence of a settlement." 
Cotton, 559 F. 2d at 1330. In _ light of the factors already 
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settlement amount falls at a reasonable point within the range of I 
possible recovery. 
2. The Amount and Nature of Discovery 
Another consideration relevant to whether a settlement is 
fair, adequate, and reasonable is whether the plaintiff has 
conducted sufficient discovery to enable the court to evaluate the 
strengths (and weaknesses) of its claims, and, thus, the 
reasonableness of the settlement. see Newberg, supra, § 11.45, at 
11-101. It is clear, however, "formal discovery is not 'a 
necessary ticket to the bargaining table.'" In re Chicken 
Antitrust Litig., 669 F.2d 228, 241 (5th Cir. 1982) (quoting In re 
Corrugated Container Antitrust Lit1g., 643 F.2d 195, 211 (5th cir. 
1981)). Indeed, informal discovery often will achieve the same 
results as formal discovery, and more efficiently. Cotton, 559 
F.2d at 1332. 
The OIG investigation in the ~nstant case lasted over three 
years, according to Special Agent Richard Todd. During that period 
of time, between forty and fifty witnesses at BCBSF, and over 
eighty witnesses in all, were interviewed. See Plaintiff 
Exhibit 5, filed on April 20, 1994. BCBSF responded to 
approximately forty to forty-five subpoenas, and in one return of 
documents alone there were some 200,000 pages of records as well 
as computer tapes containing data on millions of claims. In 
addition, a 11 van full 11 of microfilm was obtained from BCBSF. 
Hearing (4/20/94) at 50. 
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A list of all of the documents in the posssssion of the OIG 
related to this case consists of over six pages and over eighty 
entries, outlining thousands of pages of records obtained in the 
course of the United states' investigation. See Plaintiff EXhibit 
4, filed on April 20, 1994. Moreover, an inventory of computer 
analyses was also prepared and consists of forty-two items. See 
Plainti!! Exhibit 6, filed on April 20, 1994. 
Special Agent Todd testified a query on an interoffice 
computer system designed to track the nu1nber of hours spent on 
various tasks revealed government agents logged approximately 9, ooo 
hours on this case, which amounts to about four and one-half staff 
years. He further testified that, multiplying these hours by a 
cost factor for each year of the investigation, he determined the 
investigation cost the OIG some $100,000. 
In addition to the United States' three-year investigation, 
Relater was permitted an opportunity to conduct discovery 
concerning the issues raised by the Settlement Agreement. In 
particular, she was permitted two waves of interrogatories and 
requests for documents, as well as an opportunity to conduct a 
limited number of depositions. Moreover, the Court heard nearly 
three days of testimony, much of which consisted of testimony put 
on by the Relator. 
In sum, even though it may not be sufficiently prepared to go 
to trial, the United States has obtained ample information through 
its investigation to evaluate the appropriateness of settlement. 
Additionally, the parties nave provided a sufficient record on 
25 
J 
88; ~~~'.Z8G8 15L t OS - ··~7~ ·x-ff : ~cZS: ~ fG - r.0- ,.~ r 2 l =: llf\:;~  '1\~CSS;""> : .\2 l\~S' 
which the Court can evaluate the fairnesg, adequacy, and 
reasonableness of the settlement. 
3. Future Expense & Likely oyration of Further Litigation 
In evaluating the settlement, the Court must also weigh the 
benefits afforded by the Settlement Agreement against the 
substantial expense and delays associated with continued 
litigation. See Warren v. City 0£ Tampa, 693 F. Supp. 1051, 1060 
(M .. D. Fla. 1988), arr'd, 893 F.2d 347 (11th Cir. 1989). "In most 
situations, unless the settlement is clearly inadequate, its 
acceptance and approval are preferable to lengthy and expensive 
litigation with uncertain results." Newberg, supra, § 11.so, at 
11-122; see also cotton, 559 F.2d at 1331 .. 
This case is a classic example of the general rule just 
stated. The length of the united states' initial investigation and 
its cost to date are indicative of what would result if the " 
Relator's preferred course of action were chosen. To conduct the 
kind of investigation the Relater desires, the United States would 
hava t~ invest hundreds of thousands of additional dollars and 
thousands more investigators' hours over a period of months or even 
years, all with no guarantee of recovering against the Defendant. 
BCBSF is well represented in this case, and would appear to have 
the will and the resources necessary to def end this lawsuit 
vigorously over an indefinite period of time. Any recovery that 
could be obtained likely would come only after several years of 
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appeal. These factors weigh strongly in favor of the settlement 
reached. 
~- Tons of the Settlement 
"The court must be assured that the settlement secures an 
adequate advantage for the (plaintiff] in return for the surrender 
of litigation rights against the defendants. Cash as well as 
noncash consideration is appropriate, as long as the total 
consideration is sufficient." Newberg, supra, § 11.46, at 11-lOS 
to -106. As noted previously, BCBSF has agreed, as part of the 
Settlement Agreement, to pay the United States the sum of $10 
million. In addition, BCBSF agrees to accept, in settlement of its 
$15 million claim for administrative costs, the sum of $4 million. 
Finally, BCBSF agrees its costs incurred during the coursQ of the 
government's investigation and in the course of def ending and 
settling the instant action will be treated as "unallowable coats 
for government contracting purposes." Plaintiff Exhibit aa, 1 9 .. 
In consideration of the $10 million sum, the United states has 
agreed to release BCBSF "from any civil monetary claim arising from 
BCBSF's participation in the Medicare Part B program as the Florida 
Medicare Carrier that the United States has or may have under the 
False Claims Act," various other statutes, and under certain common 
law theories, that arise "out of the transactions and occurrences 
alleged in the Complaint or the Amended Complaint for the period 
from December l, 1985 through July 9, 1992. 11 Id., ~ 3. The 
release is expressly subject to certain conditions, of course. 
Foremost among these is the proviso that BCBSF remains "bound by 
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all rules or regulations that govern Medicare Part B Carriers" as 
long as it is the Florida Medicare Part B Carrier. Id., ! 6. In 
particular, it is agreed the Settlement Agreement in no way affects 
"any obligation to recoup Medicare Secondary Payer overpayments to 
private health insurers, or any obligation to account for, collect, 
or recoup any overpayment of funds to Medicare providers, 
beneficiaries, their physicians, or other assignees." Id. 
Additionally, Mr. Cascone testified regarding the settlement 
negotiations. He related they were intense negotiations and each 
side was hesitant to move. After numerous exchanges and heated 
tempers, some compromise was made and a settlement was reached 
after several months. According to Mr. Cascone, Michael Theis, the 
attorney representing the United States, discussed the settlement 
negotiations with the Relator's counsel and tried to take their 
position into consideration, and constantly represented that 
position. Although Ms. Burr was not present during the settlement 
negotiations, Mr. Cascone was concerned her presence would have 
prevented a settlement from being reached. Indeed, he testified 
he was reluctant to agree to the $10 million amount ultimately 
agreed upon. 
In sum, the terms of the Settlement Agreement are fair. There ~ 
is every indication from the face of the agreement of the give-
and-take that is the mark of an arms-length transaction. { Although l 
Relator is willing to gamble everything on a more favorable outcome 
at trial, the mere fact the United States was not willing to make 
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that bet does not mean the Settlement Agreement amounts to a sell-
out on its part. 
5. Eyidenee ot Fraud or Collusion 
It has been stated "courts respect the integrity of counsel 
and presume the absence of rraud or collusion in negotiating the 
settlement, unless evidence to the contrary is offered." Newberg, 
supra, S 11. 51. As the foregoing findings would indicate, the 
cour.t finds no evidence in the record of fraud or collusion in the ~ 
negotiation _ of the Settlement Agreement herein. Relater has 
offered nothing more than her own unsubstantiated suspicions and 
innuendo to impugn the integrity of several very competent 
attorneys and government officials. f Her allegations of fraud and 
collusion are rejected as frivolous. 9 
6. Relator's Objections 
An important consideration in assessing the fairness of any 
class action settlement is the extent and nature of the class 
reaction to the proposed settlement. In re Beef Indus. Antitrust 
Litig., 607 F.2d 167, 180 (5th cir. 1979), cert. deniGd sub nom. 
Iowa Beef Processors, Inc. v. Meat Price Investigators Assoc., 
452 U.S. 905 (1981). A settlement under the FCA is distinguishable 
9 Re la.tor makes much of tha fac;t the United state made its f irat settlement 
dQ~and baf0ro Moore and Dunham we~e asked to run th~ir computer sorts to attempt 
to document the extent of duplicate payments. However, the United Statea already 
had the benefit of Ms. Gibbs' analysis, and the Court ia not convinced it is 
inherently unreasonable to explore the possibility of settlement befors expendi.ng 
more scarce government resourea9 on damages calculations. Relator's displeasure 
with this coursa of action in this case strikes the Court aa nothing more than 
a difference of opinion over negotiation strategy. such ie clearly insufficient 
to give rise to an inference of collusion. 
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from a class action, however, in that the only individual with 
standing to object to the settlement--the relator--is not the real 
party in interest. See United States ex ral. Milam v. University 
o~ Texas M.D. Anderson Cancer Center, 961 F.2d 46, 48 (4th cir. 
1992). Nevertheless, as a result of the 1986 amendments to the qui 
tam provisions of the FCA, the relater has standing to object to 
the settlement, which comports with Congress' intent that qui tam 
plaintiffs serve as a check against government neglect of FCA 
cases. See supra. 
With these considerations in mind, the Court nevertheless 
finds, in this case at least, the Relator's objections are not well 
taken. First, rather than propose an alternative range of 
recovery, she simply states, contrary to previous representations 
on her behalf, she has insufficient evidence to make any sort of 
damages calculation. Her attorneys gave the United States, through 
correspondence, just such an estimate over six months before the 
hearing on the settlement, be~ore she received the discovery 
permitted by the court. Her plea is particularly unconvincing in 
light of the fact more than six months before the hearing, she was 
offered access to the computer tapes used by Gerald Dunham and Boyd 
Moore in their computer sort, and she refused to accept that offer. 
Relator also makes much of what she perceives as deficiencies 
in the computer analyses conducted by Terry Gibbs, Dunham and 
Moore. However, an argument could be made the reliability of these 
analyses is immaterial. If the conduct of formal discovery is not 
a necessary prerequisite to obtaining court approval of a 
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settlement, and it is not, see In re Chicken Antitrust Lltig., 
669 F.2d at 241, then it follows complex and expensive damages 
calculations ought not be a prerequisite either. Indeed, the whola 
point of entering into a pretrial settlement is to avoid the costs 
associated with preparing for a trial on the merits. 
In any event, these analyses do not appear to be as unreliable 
as the Relater suggests. Although Ms. Gibbs testified her data 
base contained line items with non-numeric values, this was not 
true of every line item. Moreover, it appears there may be an 
innocent explanation for the non-numeric values she found--namely, 
that no amount was paid because the claim was processed in January, 
and the deductible was not yet satisfied. Hearing (4/20/94) at 
277-78. 
Relator's criticism of Moore's analysis is similarly 
overstated. She asserts: 
since Moore and Dunham used a very tight match to 
identify duplicates . . . their analysis should have 
retrieved every original and duplicated claim paid or 
denied from November 1988 through March 1990 including 
over half of the $884 million or .2, 015, 385 duplicate 
claims plus the $700,000 duplicate payments to 
beneficiaries ••. and the $9,540,000 duplicates paid 
to providers and suppliers rrom November 1988 to March 
1990 ••. because dollar values~ were not part of 
the match criteria. However, only 3.6 million dollars 
in duplicates was captured in the Moore study. Clearly, 
this flawed, unscientific study is in no way able to 
support ~ settlement, yet proponents rely on it 
heavily. 




. . . claim." Id. 
First, Relator is simply wrong in 
should have retrieved "every 
Moore declared "the computer programs 
were developed to ignore the line item with the earliest paid date 
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on the assumption that the first of severa 1 a-pparent duplicate line 
items would be a properly reimbursable claim for services.,, 
Plaintiff Exhibit 12, filed on April 20, 1994, at 2 (emphasis 
added) . 
Second, she fails to mention several facts which may explain 
the differences in the numbers. Moore's analysis did not take into 
account claims with the same ICN. Hearing (4/20/94) at 293-94. 
According to BCBSF, it has, as of the data of its supplemental 
response to one of the Relator's interrogatories, recouped 
approximately $11 million in such duplicate payments. In addition, 
there was testimony at the hearing regarding instances where the 
same payment tape was run twice, resulting in two sets of checks 
being cut. Moore testified the tapes he analyzed would not reflact 
these types of overpayments. Hearing (4/20/94) at 295. 
Relater also takes the government to task for not conducting 
analyses of hew much loss resulted from the deactivation of audits 
and the use of force codes in the header of claims. However, both 
Moore and Dunham testified it would be very costly and vary time-
consuming to write programs that would conduct such analyses. 
Hearing (4/20/94} at 335-36, 364-55. Although Relator implies in 
her post-hearing submission such an analysis would be fairly easy 
to do, she produced no one at the hearing with the expertise of 
Moore or Dunham to contradict their testimony. Thus, the Court 
credits these agents' testimony over Ms. Burr 1 s lay opinion. 
Additionally, it is clear turning off or otherwise bypassing 
an edit does not automatically produce an overpayment. Moreover, 
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force coding a claim through the system is not per se improper; 
thus, any analysis of loss to the government would have to 
distinguish between: (l) claims properly processed with force 
codes, (2) claims improperly processed with force codes due solely 
to mere operator error, and (3) claims processed improperly due to 
the deliberate misuse of a force code. These facts only reinforce 
the credibility of the testimony of Moore and Dunham. 
Relator's other objections are similarly without substance. , 
In particular, she lists a host of areas for which no analysis of 
loss was conducted. Examination of these areas, however, shows her 
complaints are overstated. First, system downtime and whether ~~e 
computer was fully operational when it was brought on line are not 
the basis for the Plaintiff's claims in this lawsuit; rather, it 
is the actions BCBSF allegedly took in response to the GTEDS 
system's problems which are the gravamen of the Amended Complaint. 
Second, there was no evidence presented at the hearing that there 
were claims deleted which were never re-entered into the computer, 
and no loss to the government would result from such deletions in_..: 
any event. 1 In addition, any loss to the government from deletions 
which were re-entered into the system would be purely in the form 
of inflated administrative costs, which, the evidence suggests, 
would not necessarily result in greater cost to the government. 
Any net loss to the government from these costs is probably 
negligible when one considers the fact HCFA would have had to pay 
interest on many of these claims had they not been deleted and re-
entered. 
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Third, ~ Rela~or produced no evidence other than her own l 
testimony to prove claims were summarily denied. Even if claims 
were summarily denied, the only resulting loss to the govornm9nt 
would be in the form of inflated administrative costs which, again, 
might not be recovered by BCBSF, and might be less than any 
interest the government would have had to pay otherwise. Fourth, 
although recoupment data would show evidence of overpayments, it 
appears it would be difficult to distinguish overpayments that were 
the result of computer or operator error and those that were the 
result of intentional bypassing of audits. Todd testified the 
recoupment data was kept separate and distinct from the processing 
data, and was essentially a manual system. 
Todd testified he did not investigate Medicare Secondary Payor 
issues because there was already an ongoing investigation looking 
into that area. Moreover, the Settlement Agreement specifically 
requires BCBSF to continue to recoup MSP overpayments and cooperate 
with the Unitad States to resolve these ·issues. 
In closing, the Relater asserts "[i)t is insulting to suggest 
that the costs of litigation alone could motivate BCBSF to settle 
rather than vindicate its reputation through victory at trial if, 
as it protests, no wrongdoing occurred." Relator's Memorandum at 
29. This statement reflects a lack of awareness of the costs 
associated with long, drawn-out· litigation. In addition to the • 
financial costs, an organization defending a lawsuit must endure ·f 
the disruptions attendant to the conduct of modern discovery, and 
the resulting impact on morale as employees are diverted from their 
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ordinary duties to assist in the production of massive sets of 
documents, and to appear for deposition or trial. The effect of 
-4 
the settlement h~aring on th~ schedules of various employees of • 
BCBSF is a case in point. Moreover, the organization itself must 1 
be concerned with the effects on its reputation of the pendency of 
a case in which it is accused of fraudulent activity. 
It is because of these financial and other costs that 
organizations like BCBSF settle lawsuits for substantial sums even , 
though they vigorously deny liability. rt in no way stretches 
credulity to believe ECBSF would be willing to settle this suit for 
$10 million even while expressing confidence in a favorable outcome 
at trial:f .,. _. 
Conelusion 
While the Court has come to the conclusion the settlement 
should be approved, it in no way condones or endorses the actions 
in which BCBSF admittedly engaged. The Court simply finds the 
settlement to be a reasonable outcome under all of the 
circumstances. Although the proponents' presentations in support 
of the settlement had their shortcomings, the court is satisfied 
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RECOMMENDATION 
As outlined herein, the undersigned concludes the Settlement 
Agreement is fair, adequate, and reasonable under all the 
circumstances. Accordingly, it is recommended the Settlement 
Motions (Docs. #66 & 187) be GRANTED, the settlement filed herein 
be APPROVED, and this action he DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 
!NTEREI> at Jacksonville, Florida, this 23...J day of June, 
1994. 
Copies to: 
The Hon. John H. Moore, II 
~
HOWARD 
United ate Judge 
Chief United States District Judge 
counsel of record 
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FILED 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COCRT 
MIDDLB DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION St1 JUiJ 23 PH 3: hr:. 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
ex rel. THERESA BURR, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD 
OF FLORIDA, INC., a Florida 
Corporation, 
Defendant. 
O R D E R 
GLET,;c ,. i, .·. ·.; ~-;.~:!~f GOURT 
:'tlOOLf D::;;:;:~r u :- rLOR/0;', 
JAc:~s c::'.: ·;_~_::~. r :. .omo,1\ 
CASE NO. 91-134-Civ-J-16 
Relator's Petition to Reopen the Record (Doc. #194), filed on 
May 25, 1994, is DENIED. The evidence proffered would have no 
material bearing on tha recommendation entered on this date. 
CONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida this .2~"' day of 
June, 1994. 
Copies to: 
counsel of record 
gs1s8~:zaoe ISL tos ;_ ·nd ·xw 
~~►--- ,.J._ 
HOWARD T. SNYDER 
United States Magi 
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